How would Cohen’s second definition of inherent moral value extend to animals whose capacities equal or exceed those of infants and toddlers, and those who are otherwise impaired in a relevant way (i.e. people in comas)?
We talked a bit about this in class. Cohen's second definition of inherent moral value, defined by consciousness of duties and dignity, would exclude people who lack those capacity; I don't think that this is something with which many people can agree. The theory is not necessarily flawed by the exclusion of toddlers and people who are impaired in a relevant way; Still, talking the theory by itself, without a sufficient reason to value those people and not non-human animals, and acting upon it would be, I think, very immoral.
We could work on defending his theory and trying to include toddlers, but those attempts would be to no avail (Avery posted about that here). Additionally, even if he, Carl Cohen, could manage to include children in a morally relevant way, he still would not be able to include people who have mental disabilities. Instead, I think we have to use a different theory that operates on a sliding scale such that it could include children and other animals, given that many other animals have capacities that are greater than those of just-born children.
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