Final Paper

The following is my final paper for this class. Comments are welcome and encouraged.

Vegetarianism is morally obligatory for most humans because the inherent value of non-human animals is great enough to warrant treating them better. This better treatment includes the continuance of their lives and the cessation of our practices that intentionally cause them pain. Their inherent value comes from a variety of different sources – chiefly from sentience and self-valuation - and is incremental in nature.

            The incremental nature of inherent value does lead us to the conclusion that some lives are worth more than others. While this may be true, all sentient beings have value significant enough to grant them the positive right to life, and the negative right of freedom from harm. The nature of incremental value is useful in situations in which one is weighing different options. For instance: it is immoral to kill or contribute to the killing of adult humans and pigs (because they are both sentient and have reasonably high capacities of cognition among other factors), but in a situation where one must kill either a pig or a human in order to survive, one should choose to kill the pig, since the pig has less inherent value (it has a lower levels of sentience and capacity of cognition). It is still immoral to kill a pig, but with no other choice, it is justified.

 Humans are overwhelmingly omnivores, meaning that they can process both plant-based and animal-based nutrients. Humans are also overwhelmingly not obligate-omnivores, meaning that most humans do not need to eat both plant-based and animal-based foods to survive. In fact, most humans are nutritionally obligated to eat plant-based foods; humans can survive eating an exclusively plant-based diet, but they cannot survive eating an exclusively animal-based diet. Most people, therefore, will not encounter a situation where there are justified in killing or contributing (financially or otherwise) to the killing of a non-human animal. Instead, most humans can and should choose to survive and thrive on plant-based foods.

Additionally, since value comes from many sources, it is impossible to determine the exact sum of values that could warrant a small difference in treatment; our estimates of value are only approximate.

            The argument from marginal cases provides a decent comparison to consider when we think about how we ought to treat non-human animals. Most humans and non-human animals share capacities in varying degrees; both have the ability to perceive, adapt, and learn. Most non-human animals have a value that is comparable to the approximate value of human infants. So, we ought not to treat non-human animals any worse than we treat human infants. The inconvenience of not being able to eat readily available infants when we are hungry even though we really like how they taste is not enough to outweigh the inherent value of human infants. Similarly, the inconvenience of not being able to eat readily available non-human animals when we are hungry even though we like how they taste is not enough to outweigh the inherent value of non-human animals.

            These same arguments extend to veganism; veganism, under the current conditions, is morally obligatory for most humans. Self-defense, as in the cases of obligate-omnivores and people who severely lack resources, can allay the obligation of vegetarianism and veganism. However, such restrictions do not give people free-reign to eat whichever animals they want as often as they want.

            While it is morally best to refrain from eating meat altogether, it is better to reduce meat consumption than to continue eating it with the same frequency. It is also better to eat animals with lower inherent value than to eat animals with higher inherent value. If one is an obligate-omnivore, if one needs animal-based nutrients to survive, one should choose to eat the animals with the lowest inherent value at the lowest frequency that one can.

From Where Does Animal Value Come?

Animal value stems from a variety of different sources, and is incremental depending on those sources. The foundational capacity for value comes from sentience - the ability to experience and process pain and enjoyment. The capacity for sentience gives an organism a value that demands freedom from harm and the cessation of enjoyment. There are also a number of other factors that give an organism value: intelligence, ability to learn, instrumental value, et cetera. These capacities comes in different degrees, and is therefore incremental. An organism with a higher capacity to experience pain is more valuable in that way, than an organism with a lower capacity to experience pain.

These differences may be relevant in some situations, but they do not generally make a difference so long as we accept the basic value of animals and the treatment that such a value would warrant. A random pig because of it's higher sentience and intelligence, has a higher moral value than a random cow. This does not mean that we should treat cows less well, it means that when forced to choose one animal worse, we ought to choose to treat the cow worse. In most everyday situations, this is irrelevant, but that does not mean that it is entirely useless.

What I Took Away From This Class

I started this course with a decently well developed understanding of animal ethics, as it is something about which I think rather often. Since I did have a decent understanding of animal ethics, there were a few topics on which I didn't really change my mind. I started the course as a vegetarian, and I am still convinced that it is morally obligatory. I am, however, much more firm in this belief. Additionally, I also gained a new understanding of veganism; I intend to become a vegan when I am no longer subject to Aramark's lousy (read: virtually non-existent) vegan options.

I also developed a new understanding of 'pet-keeping,' and while I have always considered to role of 'pet-keeping' to be more similar to guardianship, I will, in the future, refer to it as guardianship. Additionally, I have come to understand how the pet market works, such that if I do want an animal companion (which I don't think is necessarily immoral in itself), I will work with an animal shelter rather than a pet-store. I don't want to contribute to the immoral practices involved in obtaining animals for stores.

I am still a bit unsure about animal testing, but I plan to work that out soon. There are, I think, certain cases in which animal testing is entirely immoral. Cosmetic testing is immoral, but I'm not sure if AIDS research on apes - since they do not contract the HIV virus - is necessarily immoral if the apes are treated well apart from their shots.

Title: A Subtitle

In response Brian - full post here

I would agree with your assessment of our moral ability to constrain non-human animals in certain situations. I would compare our ability to interfere with the lives of non-humans to our ability to interfere with the lives of human children.

Human children certainly have conscious, physiological, and psychological interests. We have the moral ability, and perhaps even the moral obligation to prevent children from causing severe harm to themselves. We should prevent children from crossing busy roads, doing hard drugs, harming other people, et cetera. From this I suppose we'd have to conclude that we are obligated to take care of non-human animals in the same way. Though this might be dangerous if we take the argument to its absurd conclusion: we are morally obligated to prevent as much serious harm as we can.

I do wonder if, to get around this, we can make a distinction between the animals of whom we are guardians and animals who don't have guardians. The distinction seems (and probably is) irrelevant, but I can't see how we could avoid the aforementioned conclusion and its negative consequences.

Subjects vs. Motivations

in response to Kurtiss - full post here

The question of who to blame for the immoral actions of a moral patient is quite an interesting one. Practically, however, blame is quite irrelevant because we cannot change the  events of the past. More importantly, we should strive to make sure that the same immoral action does not occur again.

It can certainly useful to figure out the source of immorality, but blaming the source doesn't really matter. Additionally, it is very difficult to determine how many sources there were, and to what extend they influenced the action. We should, regardless of source or blame, provide resources to make sure that the action doesn't happen again.

Using your example of the dog and the neighbors guardian, we can take a number of different actions. We can encourage the guardian to help the neighbor replant the garden. We can help the guardian to pay for training classes. We can help both the neighbor and the guardian to purchase a fence to keep the dog out. We can do many things to prevent the action.

I think it is important to not focus on blame. Even in the case of human-committed immoral acts, blame isn't as important as rehabilitation and prevention. Blame (which focuses on subjects) leads us to retribution and revenge, while identifying a causes (motivations and reasons) can help us to prevent harm, while helping humans and non-humans alike.

Americans vs. The World vs. Non-Human Animals

In response to Sebastian - full post here

You bring up a very interesting point. Still, I think the problem is even deeper than looking after the welfare of humans rather than non-human animals. Try to convince Americans, they are the only people to whom I have direct access, that they should value the life of a citizen of a different nation as much as an American citizen. If we can't convince people that citizenship to an arbitrary nation isn't relevant to value of a life, how could we convince them that species is relevant. On a slightly more humorous note: I can imagine some Americans saying that American animals are more important than animals in other nations. Something that is less humorous is that I can imagine some Americans saying that American animals are more important than people from other nations. As it is, we already value the cats and dogs more than we do the more intelligent pigs.

Personally, I try my best to talk to people to help them understand that harm is bad when it befalls anybody and that we should strive to eliminate all harm, regardless of citizenship, skin-tone, sexual orientation, gender, species, et cetera. Depending on the person, I'll occasionally talk about socialism and about how we humans have the resources to take care of everybody, though we lack the drive and motivation or the knowledge.

Pet-Keeping

Is there anything that is inherently wrong with pet-guardianship?

This is a rather difficult question for me to answer. I want to say that there is nothing inherently wrong with pet-guardianship  but I am well aware of the number of problems that we are having in regards to pet-guardianship. Breeding, for instance, just to get better pets is, I think, not morally justified. If one buys a pet at a pet store, one is contributing either towards this kind of breeding or to the very unethical practice of capturing animals from the wild. The problem here is that, while there may be nothing wrong with pet-guardianship, if there is a problem with the means through which we gain access to animals, then the morality of pet-guardianship itself is irrelevant. Pet-guardianship would only be justified if one happened upon an animal in need of guardianship, or if one was taking care of an animal who has already been bred or captured with assurance that that it would not contribute towards the continuation of current practices.

The next question, then, is what do we do with animals who are in pet-stores? What will happen if we don't adopt them? How will we contribute towards the continuation of the industry if we do?

Laws or Societal Recognition?

In response to Brian - full post here

This is an interesting topic. I just wrote a post on the appropriateness of legal licensure, but this post raises an interesting question. I suppose I would still argue that licensure - that is, regulations by law - is morally appropriate, but I am not certain about its necessity, and, as you pointed out, something needs to change. I would also agree that among the most important changes is the societal change of recognition of the moral status of non-human animals.

Ideally, and we should work towards this, we would want a society in which there was little need for the laws and regulations because it would be socially unacceptable to 'own' non-human animals, and treat them in a way that is below their inherent moral value. I can also see how simply changing a law may not convince most people of their value. Many, I'd assume, would rebel against such laws and possibly treat animals worse. Still, I agree that we need to work on social recognition of animal rights (and many other rights issues on which we are painfully slow to change (i.e. gender, sexual orientation, et cetera).

Licensure

What is the relationship between animal licensure and child licensure?

I think that these two ideas are very similar, and if we concluded that one was morally necessary we would likely reach the conclusion that the other one is as well. The argument from marginal cases constantly reminds us of the truth that that non-human animals have capacities that are on par with or otherwise similar to human infants. As such, if their value is the same, any treatment and protection granted to one group should likewise be granted to the other.

I think that it would be morally appropriate to enact a law that prevents individuals from assuming guardianship and responsibility for another life if the individual is not prepared or otherwise ready. As it is, we already require other doctors and other caretakers to have certain certification and so on. This law would ideally not discriminate based on membership to a certain species.

Guilt and Embarrassment

In response to Brian - full post here

This is actually quite the interesting topic. I think, in general, I would agree with you. Since there is no reliable way to determine what animal humiliation would look like, it would be difficult to be able to actually determine if a non-human animal has a sense of humiliation.

I also agree that it is likely that a number of animals probably don't experience embarrassment simply because they are not social and would therefore have no use for those feelings; crocodiles don't care about the feelings and thoughts of other crocodiles.

Still, I am wondering about the similarities between humilation/embarrassment and guilt. I am inclined to say that many non-human animals do experience guilt; wolves and dogs come to mind as animals who can feel guilty. It seems that guilt and embarrassment/humiliation function similarly to a similar end. So, it seems, if these two are related, that it's likely that some non-human animals can experience something close to humiliation. However, since guilt and embarrassment are socially learned responses, it seems unlikely that zoos and aquariums would provoke such feelings from non-human animals. Still, it might be the case that more intelligent animals would be able to learn the social cues that would warrant guilt in humans.

Relevance of Culture

In response to Perri - full post here

I think I would agree with your assessment of the relevance of culture in reference to hunting. I would also extend this argument to most other moral issues.

I am not inclined to think that culture is relevant to most discussions of morality. It is true that we should respect different cultures, but I do not think that respecting other culture can extend to the mistreatment of others. If it was the practice of one culture to knock five times on a door, open it, cross the threshold, count to 3, step backwards, do a handstand, cross the threshold again, and spin thrice before remaining in a room, I think that we should respect that because, as far as we can tell, it objectively does not harm others.

However, if the practices of hunting and animal consumption are maintained for cultural reasons, then I think it is fair to say that culture is not relevant to the discussion. As far as we can tell, the truth of animal suffering is objective; the capacity for animals to experience pain is not diminished based on the culture in which the animal lives. The same thing can be true of slavery and other forms of oppression and objectification.

There are, of course, many situations in which the appropriate reaction is not clear. While many people in western society would consider it abuse to come home from work and deal three slaps across the face and a punch to stomach, if it was part of a culture for a woman to come home from work and beat her agender spouse in the aforementioned ways, and if the agender spouse were to consent their wife beating them, then we should respect this difference in culture. We should certainly make sure that the object of these actions are actually consenting, but beyond that we have little right to interfere.

Justifiable or Understandable

In response to Raj - full post here

I think there are many interesting things to consider here. For instance, even if trophy hunting was understandable given the situation in Zimbabwe, is it morally justified? I would tend to say no; I think it is still morally unjustified, especially given the deaths of so many elephants who are intelligent, sentient, and inherently worth much.

This situation reminds me of slavery; without slavery, the southern economy would have taken a very large hit, and would have sent them into uncertainty. Even if the south, however, was destined to fail if the abolished slavery, does that mean that slavery was morally justified, or rather that it was morally understandable? I think in the cases of the southern USA and Zimbabwe, the actions are understandable but not justifiable. People in both areas had/have the moral duty to try to end those practices regardless of how well the practices work and how understandable they are.

Trivial Human Interests

In response to Quincy - full post here

I would agree with your assessment of the meaning of trivial human interests. I am not yet sure if trivial human interests means that the action brought about through the interest is necessarily immoral. I think the relative immorality depends on the treatment of the animal as well. If an non-human animal had to die in order to be a spectacle at a zoo, then it would certainly be immoral.

One trivial human interest that I think is most prevalent in our society and is often overlooked as trivial is the consumption of meat. Most human beings can survive quite well with a vegetarian diet - that is, a diet without meat. Many humans continue to bring about the deaths of animals for consumption because it's slightly inconvenient to not do so and/or because they like the taste of meat. I think both of those are rather trivial interests, and, seeing as how it does require the death of a non-human animal, it is certainly not a morally justified action for most human beings.

Obligation of Caretaking.

In response to Michael - full post here

I am not convinced that it would ever be morally obligatory to eat a nutritional diet. Each person has a right to eat things of their own choosing, so we could hardly ever oblige someone to eat in a specific way.

Though, I can see an exception, I suppose. A caretaker, for instance, should refrain from eating a diet so awful that they will not live long enough to fulfill their duties as a caretaker. This also depends on the object of ones care. Children, parrots, chimps, certain dogs (like seeing-eye dogs), et cetera, can all sustain incredible emotional damage from the death of a caretaker; many animals will refuse to eat when their caretaker dies, and will therefore die themselves.

The obligation of caretaking for more intelligent beings overrules many other choices that would otherwise be a matter of personal preference. A person should not do substantially risky things if they are in charge of the well-being of another individual because the choice involves more than their individual preference.

Thank you for this post; I appreciate the thoughts to which it helped lead me.

Also, while I don't necessarily agree with objective morals (I don't know if they exist) I don't know if it is appropriate to consider culture, religion, and time when discussing morality. Access to information is important, I agree.

Humans and Animals (and 'Racism'?)

Humans and animals. Humans or animals. Humans vs. animals. Are these legitimate separations?

Humans are animals; so, from where does this fictional distinction come? I honestly cannot say when or where humans began to use 'animals' exclusively to describe non-human animals. I can say that I think that the choice to continue to separate them in this way is harmful, in addition to being false and dishonest, to humans and non-human animals. I also wonder about the relation between this separation and the separation of 'race.' 'Race' is not a thing that actually exists; instead, 'race' refers to phenotypic characteristics like the darkness of one's skin. Also, as I understand it, humans also may have unnecessarily changed our species name; the move to referring to homo sapiens was not biologically justified. It seems like these problems all have the related problem of creating arbitrary distinctions.

I usually (it is difficult to break a habit) refer to non-human animals as non-human animals, and I usually refer to people of different 'races' by referring to the comparative darkness or lightness of their skin tone.

Sorry this is sort of jumbled up in an awful mess of thoughts. Do you folks have any thoughts about these things?

Anthropomorphism or Anthropocentrism

In response to Andrew - full post here

While I think it is true that humans and non-human animals do not have the same rights, I am not sure how much I agree with the describing the comparison of humans and non-human animals as anthropomorphism. It's true that it seems, on its face, that we are taking animals and comparing them to humans; in a way that is precisely what we are doing.

Still, and put more clearly, what we are actually doing is recognizing the characteristics that humans and non-human animals share. Evolution is a process, and as such, we find elements of certain traits in less evolved animals. I suppose we could say that humans have (slightly more evolved) non-human animal traits.

It's not fair to say pigs are like humans because they are curious, but it is fair to say pigs and humans share, in some way, the trait that is curiosity. The truth is that animals are similar, and it would be some sort of intellectually neglectful and dishonest to not recognize those similarities and the importance that those similarities have.

It seems that the Animal Agricultural Alliance, through calling this comparison anthropomorphism, is actually demonstrating anthropocentrism of a sort.

Moral Obligation to Research?

In response to Kurtiss - full post here

This is a very interesting concept. I cannot tell if I agree with the idea and/or the sentiment. It seems to me that this conclusion and moral imperative would extend to more than vegetarians who maybe should be vegans. I think this would also extend to meat-eaters, if we accepted it; meat-eaters are morally responsible for determining how their food comes to their plates.

In many ways finding compelling evidence in favour of veganism is much more difficult than finding evidence for vegetarianism. So, any obligation that vegetarians have to search for reasons to be vegan would certainly apply to meat-eaters, since it would be easier to find information on vegetarianism.

Still, I am not sure how morally obligatory it is to know or research various activities in which one might be engaged; people engage in many activities during the day, and they are often busy with many things. So how should one decide what to look up? What if the thought honestly never occurs to them?

Moral Value of Diet

Is a full vegan diet necessarily morally better than vegetarian diet, and is a vegetarian diet necessarily morally better than a pescetarian diet?

This question touches upon at least two separate issues. The first of which is the nature of the food items that one consumes in a given diet. A vegetarian diet excludes the consumption of animals, and the vegan diet excludes the consumption of eggs and dairy products. While I do know of many people who consume fish and call themselves vegetarians, I am not sure what to say about people who consume shell-fish and call themselves vegetarians. Shell-fish are animals, but in reference to many different sources of value, they are really not worth more than plants. So, a person who consumes shell-fish may technically be a pescetarian, but in most other ways is essentially a vegetarian. The same can be said about a "vegan" who consumes the eggs of an ethically-treated chicken.This, I think, means that the label of a diet is not necessarily morally better than any other label. A meat eater, if they consumed cloned meat, may have a diet that is morally on par with the diet of a vegetarian.

The second part refers to the idea that people who are vegan are necessarily more moral than those who are vegetarians, and that vegetarians are necessarily more moral than pescetarians. Is a vegetarian who must eat dairy and egg to get proper nutrients less moral than a vegan who can get those nutrients from other sources?  Is a pescetarian who must eat some animal product to get the proper nutrients less moral than a vegetarian?I would answer this, I think, with a no, provided that the individuals do everything in their power to lower their contribution to the unethical attainment of eggs and diary, or fish.. Even if they could not though, I agree with the idea that ought implies can; if a person could not sustain a vegan diet or a vegetarian diet, they should not be morally reprimanded for it.

Why Rights?

In response to Andy - full post here

I think the reason for trying to decide on the rights and value of non-human animals is precisely to decide when and to what extent we are allowed to harm the animal.

If a non-human animal has the same value and rights as a human then it would unacceptable to do to an animal what we would not do to a human. If it is only okay to kill humans in self-defense situations (regardless of how harmless the killing is), and if non-human animals have the same rights as humans, then it would only be okay to kill non-human animals in self-defense situations.

The problem with not recognizing their rights and trying to operate on a "respect as much as you (anyone) can" principle is that many people will decide that they don't have any respect for animals. So, unless there are some reasons to which we can point and say, animals have such-an-such rights, the value of animals is subjective. The conclusion can also become sort of slippery slope, unless we fall victim to speciesism.

Vegetarianism for Pets and Children?

Question: Does one have the moral obligation to provide a vegetarian diet to those of whom one is taking care?

The question is asking this: if you are taking care of a living animal (including humans), do you have an obligation to provide that animal with a vegetarian diet?

I think the answer to this question depends on a number of factors. Firstly, one must decide if abstinence from meat is even necessary in the diet of those of whom one is taking care. Parrots, for example, are mostly herbivorous, but some parrots do require animal protein, but they can get that protein from slugs and other grubs that have very little moral value. In the case of these parrots, a vegetarian diet may not be necessary at all.

Secondly, the animal should be able to get all their essential nutrients from the vegetarian diet, and the person providing the food should have all the necessary resources to provide the vegetarian food.

So, since cats are carnivorous, people have no obligation to feed their cats vegetarian diets. In fact, people may have the obligation to provide meat for their cats. Dogs, being omnivores with a carnivorous bias, could probably safely consume a mostly but not entirely meat-free diet. A human who is unable to make a choice in their diet, but could survive on a vegetarian diet, should be fed a vegetarian diet. Note again that this depends highly on each individual animal's needs.

I think the most interesting case is that of a child. Does one have an obligation to provide a child with a vegetarian diet. In this particular case, I would say no. Many vegetarians become ill after consuming meat when they have not done so for a long time. Since a child is unable to make the choices to accommodate that health risk, I think it is best to provide a child with a mostly vegetarian diet with occasional exposure to animal bacteria. Vegetarian should always be available as a choice for a child.

Moral Obligation (Response to Tyler)

In response to Tyler - full post here

I think it would be altogether wonderful if the desire to eat meat naturally dissipated after meeting those conditions that you specified. Unfortunately that is not something that is very likely to happen. So, in response, we need to determine if, regardless of people's desire, it is wrong to eat meat, and therefore obligatory to follow a vegetarian diet. The question is thus: what if the desire doesn't dissipate?

Here is an argument that can result from the conclusion that "people only have a moral obligation to form a congruenc[e] between their beliefs and actions":

Hitler believed that it was okay and even good to kill millions of Jewish people, and he did kill millions of Jewish people. Therefore, he fulfilled his moral obligations.

Basically, the conclusion that one must reach from this argument is that actions have no moral value, and that any action can be justified in reference to belief. This would probably lead to a high crime rate with no way to justly defend people's rights.

Instead, I think we need to realize that, while one does not have an obligation to believe in a moral proposition, people are obligated to act in a moral way. People can believe that vegetarianism is wrong and that it's okay to kill millions of people, but if eating animals and killing millions of people is wrong, then people have the moral obligation to be vegetarian and to refrain from killing millions of people.

Dolphins, Apes, Pigs, Whales, and.... Parrots!

Whales and Apes, Whales and Apes, Whales and Apes.

I've noticed in recent readings that many of the authors cite examples of animals with high cognitive ability; the most commonly cited demonstration of high cognitive ability is the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror. People overwhelmingly use the examples of dolphins, apes, and whales; sometimes this list includes pigs. I would agree that these animals certainly display high intelligence and cognitive ability. However, I have noticed that one particularly bright animal is left out of the mix almost every time; I have not read a scholarly defense of animal sentience that uses the example of the parrot.

Many kinds of parrots are incredibly intelligent. There are many documented cases of parrot intelligence. The most famous of these is the African grey parrot, Alex. Alex is credited with several cognitive feats - among them are the following:
- Seeing himself in a mirror and, being unfamiliar with the color grey, asking "what color me?". When he was told that he was grey, he was thereafter able to identify the color grey on other objects.
- Alex also became aware of the concept on none before being taught about zero - he was asked how many red objects there were in a mess of green, blue, yellow, and orange objects. Seeing none, he just shook his head. Note that the concept of zero is relatively new to human knowledge.

Also, one African grey parrot was taught the concepts of bigger and smaller, and, using that knowledge, said "I want bigger" when his owners tried to put him in his cage; he refused to sleep in his cage until his owners bought a sufficiently large enough cage. It turns out that the parrot would stand for nothing less than his own full room. Fortunately, the owners obliged.

So, my question, related to this, is why is it that people tend to exclude parrots as examples of intelligent animal species? Is there something that is gained or lost from doing so?

A Tailored Mandate

In response to Sean - full post here

Personally, I think that vegetarianism isn't imperative for everybody; I think the need for vegetarianism should be tailored to each individual person.

Fortunately, humans are generally omnivores (somewhat lousy ones, but that is nearly besides the point), and as such they are able to choose between animal  and vegetation sustenance; omnivorism is a matter of choice and opportunity rather than necessity. So, the majority of humans could likely maintain a vegetarian diet with few (if any) problems.  However, there are certainly some individuals who, for a variety of reasons, cannot get all the nutrients they need from plant-based sources alone. As such, they are well within their rights to continue eating animal meat.

To go along with this, I would also add that ethics about a sliding scale in many ways. Veganism, for instance, is perhaps more ethically ideal than vegetarianism, but some people lack the resources and have allergies, which prevents them from being full time vegans; still, they should opt to be as ethical as they can be. So, in the case of a person who can't be a vegetarian due to being unable to get all the nutrients they need from plant-based foods, that individual should try only to eat the animal(s) with lowest value and only do so around as often as they need to in order to get the proper nutrients.

I suppose, also, that I would slightly alter Rollin's conclusion before I agree to it. I would say that if we are to use animals out of necessity, it is morally incumbent upon us to make that they benefit as well, by at least living decent lives, not lives of misery, fear, and pain.

Humans as Marginal Cases

In response to Raj. - full post here

Related to the problem of the infinite regress is the possibility of transhumanism and of the existence other intelligent life forms.

If we place value on something that falls into the infinite regress, as you mentioned, our system of ethics leaves itself open to the problem of devaluing a life purely on the basis of the existence of a more aware life form.

Transhumanism - the augmentation of humans through technology and different sciences - brings the possibility of humans who will have higher order thinking skills that would be better than our own and would therefore supersede our moral rights. So, if we value C+1, a being with C+2 could make C+2 the cut-off line for value.

The notion of transhumanism in general is useful in ethics because it places humans in a place that is similar to the marginal cases; human capacities will be marginal compared to transhumans. Even if transhumanism weren't an eventual reality, if the results from even a thought experiment including transhumanism or intelligent aliens do not ring well with us, then it is probably something that we need to seriously consider.

Brain Size

In response to Patrick (full post here)

Hey, I think it's interesting that you mentioned the sizes of brains as a reason to believe that we are more intelligent than other species. I wasn't aware that people still held that opinion; I thought it died like 40 years ago, still I would not be horribly surprised if I heard some person saying it on the street.

Obviously, as you pointed out, believing that brain size has anything to do with intelligence is largely unfounded. From our studies of animals, the closest science is to this view, is the view, which may actually be truthful, that intelligence is more closely related to the ratio of body-size to brain-size. We can see evidence of this in the animal kingdom, even excluding humans. Many parrots have small brains, while horses have larger brains. Still, the parrot brain is larger compared to the size of the body; the parrot is also more intelligent.

It's also interesting because the majority of the most intelligent animals on the planet are around middle-sized. It seems like, starting from the smallest organisms, increase in size generally coincides with increase of intelligence, but at a certain point of size, the increase of size starts to coincide with decreased intelligence. This is not a rule by any means (as there are many exceptions), but it might be more than coincidence.

Linguistic or Behavioural

Question: In the case of Mary, which evidence is more compelling – linguistic or behavioural?

In the case of Mary, I am convinced that behavioral evidence is more compelling, especially if it contradicts the linguistic evidence. We mentioned deception in class and, though I am not necessarily convinced that consciousness started as a means to deceive, it's true that humans have such an ability. It's also true that the behavioural response, as it exists on a more primitive level, is more difficult to fully control to sync up with linguistic deception. If a person says that they are not in pain, yet they scream, contort their faces, and grit their teeth, it is probably safe to assume that they are indeed in some sort of distress. This, I suppose would not be the case, if they proceeded to tell you that they had a number of disorders that caused them to do all of those things even when they are not in pain. 

It seems to me that descriptive and explanatory linguistic accounts may be more compelling, in many cases, than behavioural actions. Still, a simple linguistic account may not suffice to explain away behavioural actions. I do not know where one would have to draw the line; I suppose this would highly depend on each individual case.

Vegetarianism (A clever title)

In response to Sean (full post here)

Interestingly, I think vegetarianism is actually decently likely to have some success; there are many people who care more, I think, for nonhuman animals, than they do for humans, and there are many people who care about neither. It is also true that there are many people who care more for humans, and many who care equally for both groups.

The number of meat substitutes available is increasing; in fact, in the US vegetarian food sales have doubles since 1999. Italy and Germany have around a 10% vegetarian and/or vegan population.

I think the dilemma is partially related at least to the attitude towards nonhuman animals, but I also think that even further below that is our insecurities, and wanting to treat things poorly; it just so happens that it is more socially acceptable to treat non-humans in that way.

Regarding your own issues with vegetarianism, perhaps there is some sort of rational or motivation you have for not being a vegetarian? Many people I know have accepted the arguments for vegetarianism, but were deterred by other thoughts until they thought long and hard about vegetarianism, and the possibility of becoming vegetarians.

Equal Worth?

In reference to the marginal cases argument, are all humans equal in value?

I would have to argue no for this one, too. It definitely seems a bit strange, and perhaps wrong to me, to suggest this, but I think it is the case. Of course, we did mention in class that this would possibly lead to some strange ethics. I'm not entire sure about the solution to this problem.

I do think that human infants and mentally disabled have less intrinsic value than adult humans. The source of this difference, I think, is the capacity of full cognition. This would then lead to the conclusion that even adult humans who have slightly lower cognition are worth less. There is, currently at least, no means to measure, cognition. I do think, however, that cognition can come in many forms, and that no form is necessarily better than any other; cognition through abstractions of numbers is no more valuable that cognition through spatio-temporal relations, and so on.

Come to think of it, however, for the most part, such a conclusion has no serious effect. The ability to experience and process pain is enough to prevent any person from harming another being. After a certain point of sentience and cognitive ability, it doesn't make much of a difference. The difference between the treatment of two people with similar but not equal cognitive abilities, would be none except that if you had to kill one, or cause one a significant amount of harm, you should choose to harm or kill the one with less cognitive ability. Since there is no way of know, and since it would hardly make a difference anyway, this moral choice is basically irrelevant.

Thoughts?

Language and Moral Relevance

Is the capacity to use language a morally relevant trait?

I would argue that the capacity to use learned language in not a morally relevant trait. We said this in class: language is the means through which we understand the world; language is not the means by which we understand the world. The capacity to make associations and learn is the morally relevant characteristic. Human infants, for instance, have the capacity to make associations and thereby understand the world and have beliefs. If human infants did not have this capacity that would not be able to learn a language at all.

Before we, as adult humans, have a thought and use language to communicate, we have no make non-lingual connections first. Language is how we communicate our beliefs and thoughts about those non-lingual connections. If we didn't have beliefs and desires and connections before we had language, then we probably wouldn't have language.

Speciesism

In response to Andrew (here) and Sean (here)

Speciesism is characterized by assigning different rights and value to different species of animals based on morally irrelevant differences. Saying that humans are, in general, more valuable than dogs because humans have higher mental capacities is not speciesist. Saying that humans are better than dogs because humans walk on two legs, or rather, simply because they are human is speciesist.

A related problem, as you pointed out, involves not recognizing that there are no abilities that all humans have that most animals do not have; it's not speciesist, it's just factually inaccurate. The argument from marginal cases brings this particular point out. It would, I think, be speciesist to say that sentience only matter when it is possessed to the extent that humans have and that anything less than that is useless or irrelevant, because it involves arbitrarily assigning a point of relevance based on species.

I don't know if that helps any. I certainly think that most human lives are worth more than most animals lives, and I don't think that's speciesist.

Parrots and Learned Language

In response to Andrew; one can find his post here

On a related note, parrots have a learned language system. We don't really know how complex it is, but, at the very least, they learn there own "names" (a certain type of call) and have "names" for their homes and certain locations that they frequent. Parrots' names are similar to the names of the parents who raised them rather than the names of their biological parents. This has led to some jokes (of a sort, since they are kind of true) about parrot surnames; parrots have names based on their parents, which goes back for many generations. Many scientists are excited to continue to study parrot communication in hopes that so doing will help us to learn about how our languages developed.

I've been thinking about this quite a bit recently, and I think, as far as my knowledge can take me, that a learned language must have some kind of grammatical structure. Additionally, I think that the emphasis on learning is highly important to gauging how well an animal understands; if it can learn, then it must be able to understand, I think. Human children, for instance, have not learned any language that allows them to express their thoughts, still, in order to learn languages successfully, they have to make non(pre?)-lingual connections that allow them to associate a sound with an object. So, if human children have this ability of non-lingual understanding, I think it is safe to say that many other animals also have that capacity.

I am certainly no expert in the way of knowledge about pre-lingual cognition, so I cannot say everything without a doubt; I am sure there is much confusion about it in the scientific community too.

Care Ethics

Josephine Donovan, while perhaps less preachy than Regan and Singer, has a theory that is, I think, very assuming and generalizing in a way that is not fair, or even correct. The problem with mainly emotion-based ethics is that there are 7 billion people in the world, all of whom have different DNA, different geological surroundings, different cultures, different parents (who had different DNA, friends, cultures, surroundings, etc), different friends (who have different parents (who have different DNA, friends, cultures, surrounding, etc)). There are 7 billion people in the world who have entirely different experiences; there are very few claims that one can make that apply to all humans. Therefore, saying that one will necessarily feel bad for a cow when they see a human torturing it is not actually true. Her theory would also produce a problem for animals that many humans detest intensely (snakes for example).

While I personally feel bad for most animals, I am aware that other people do not. Actually, I tend to feel most bad for the animals that other people don't tend to care about, like snakes. So, in caring for the animal, I would rather that people act in a way that is based on reason rather than emotion.

I have no need for trying to force people to feel a certain way or pretend that they are wrong for not feeling that way; I don't think it is right to invalidate other people's experiences. Her section was interesting to me, because she was saying that human's view animals as defective humans, but, without saying it, she's basically implying that humans who don't sympathize with cows are emotionally defective humans.

Q & A Question 1

How would Cohen’s second definition of inherent moral value extend to animals whose capacities equal or exceed those of infants and toddlers, and those who are otherwise impaired in a relevant way (i.e. people in comas)?

We talked a bit about this in class. Cohen's second definition of inherent moral value, defined by consciousness of duties and dignity, would exclude people who lack those capacity; I don't think that this is something with which many people can agree. The theory is not necessarily flawed by the exclusion of toddlers and people who are impaired in a relevant way; Still, talking the theory by itself, without a sufficient reason to value those people and not non-human animals, and acting upon it would be, I think, very immoral.

We could work on defending his theory and trying to include toddlers, but those attempts would be to no avail (Avery posted about that here). Additionally, even if he, Carl Cohen, could manage to include children in a morally relevant way, he still would not be able to include people who have mental disabilities. Instead, I think we have to use a different theory that operates on a sliding scale such that it could include children and other animals, given that many other animals have capacities that are greater than those of just-born children.

Initial Thoughts

Moral value, I think, does come in terms of degree based on a variety of factors.

I suppose I can agree that being the subject of the life has some value, in that we do not really need to deal with the ethics of how to treat rocks and dirt. I think, however, that the focus should fall more on certain relevant characteristics of life. Sentience, for instance, is a relevant characteristic of life, whereas the ability to respond to a stimulus is less relevant, given that it doesn't really require much in the way of biological complexity in order to do so. I don't think it would suffice to choose more complex relevant characteristics given the diversity of the human experience and ability. I imagine that we could draft some more relevant characteristics. 

I suppose that the problem, after you choose the relevant characteristics, is deciding what kind of treatment is appropriate for each degree/extend of the relevant characteristic. We need to be ever aware that humans can fall very low and very high (since they are currently the point to which all others are scaled) on the degree to which they hold any characteristic.

Hallo

Greetings,

My name is Brandon. I am a human. I am a philosophy major with a double minor in business administration and computer science. I grew up in Worcester, Massachusetts, so that's interesting; I've been told by many people that I have an interesting accent and most people are kind of shocked when I say that I am from the Worcester area. This isn't really relevant at all, but I am an asexual grey-romantic (if anyone is at all curious about these, feel free to ask in whatever medium you so choose).

Just like everybody else, I have a number of philosophies to which I generally adhere. However, I think that I shall begin the course by not really defining or describing any of them in any significant detail. I personally think it's interesting to try to figure that sort of thing out as you go along. Anyhow, I am greatly looking forward to blogging and class discussions, I think, at least it seems to me, that this class will be very active. I am 100% excited. I look forward to being inspired, and I hope that I can inspire some of you.